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Abstract
We heuristically demonstrate that Shor’s algorithm for computing general discrete
logarithms, modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform to be used with control
qubit recycling, achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single
run. By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly,
and by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we furthermore show
how the algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single
run. We provide concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified
algorithm, as a function of the group order, the size of the search space in the classical
post-processing, and the additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly.
In analogy with our earlier works, we show how the modified quantum algorithm may
be simulated classically when the logarithm and group order are both known.
1 Introduction
In a groundbreaking paper [22] from 1994, subsequently extended and revised in a later publica-
tion [23], Shor introduced polynomial time quantum computer algorithms for factoring integers
and for computing discrete logarithms in F∗p. Although Shor’s algorithm for computing discrete
logarithms was originally described for F∗p, it may be generalized to any finite cyclic group,
provided the group operation may be implemented efficiently using quantum circuits.
Shor’s algorithms are significant, in that the security of virtually all currently widely de-
ployed asymmetric cryptosystems is underpinned by either of the two aforementioned problems.
The security of RSA [20] is based on the intractability of the factoring problem. Schemes such
as Diffie-Hellman [4] and DSA [5] rely on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem.
In this paper, we analyze the success probability of a derivative of Shor’s algorithm for
computing discrete logarithms, modified to enable efficient implementation using the semi-
classical Fourier transform [10] with control qubit recycling [16]. We heuristically demonstrate
that the derivative achieves over 99% success probability in a single run, if the number of
group operations that are evaluated quantumly is slightly increased compared to Shor’s original
algorithm, and if a limited search is performed in the classical post-processing.
The results in this paper may be used to develop estimates of the overall complexity of
attacking schemes that rely on the intractability of the discrete logarithm problem, and to
enable fair comparisons of quantum algorithms for computing discrete logarithms.
1.1 Preliminaries
Let G under  be a cyclic group of order r generated by g, and let
x = [d] g = g  g  · · ·  g︸ ︷︷ ︸
d times
.
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Given x, a generator g and a description of G and , the discrete logarithm problem is to
compute d = logg x. In the general discrete logarithm problem 0 ≤ d < r, whereas d is smaller
than r by some order of magnitude in the short discrete logarithm problem. The order r
may be assumed know or unknown. Both cases are cryptologically relevant. In cryptologic
applications, the group G is typically a subgroup to F∗p or an elliptic curve group.
Given a description of G and , the order finding problem is the problem of computing r.
Miller [14] showed that the problem of finding a factor of a composite integer N may be reduced
to an order finding problem in a random subgroup of Z∗N . Shor [22] uses this approach to factor
integers by using a quantum algorithm to solve the order finding problem.
1.1.1 Notation
We use the below notation throughout this paper:
• u mod n denotes u reduced modulo n constrained to 0 ≤ u mod n < n.
• {u}n denotes u reduced modulo n constrained to −n/2 ≤ {u}n < n/2.
• due, buc and duc denotes u rounded up, down and to the closest integer.
• | a+ ib | = √a2 + b2 where a, b ∈ R denotes the Euclidean norm of a+ ib.
1.2 Earlier works
Shor’s order finding algorithm works by inducing a periodicity in r, extracting information on
the period using the quantum Fourier transform (QFT), and classically post-processing the
output using the method of continued fraction expansion to recover r.
Specifically, a control register of 2m qubits1 is first initialized to a uniform superposition of
all values a ∈ [0, 22m), where m = dlog2 re. Then [a] g is computed to a second register. When
the QFT is applied to the control register, this maps the quantum system
|Ψ 〉 = 1
2m
22m−1∑
a= 0
| a, [a] g 〉 QFT−−−−→ 1
22m
22m−1∑
a= 0
22m−1∑
j= 0
e2pii aj/2
2m | j, [a] g 〉 . (1)
In practice, the generalized exponentiation [a] g would be computed using the generalized
square-and-multiply algorithm: Let a = a0+2a1+2
2a2+. . . for ai selected uniformly at random
from {0, 1} for i ∈ [0, 22m). Then [a] g = [a0+2a1+22a2+. . . ] g = [a0] g[2a1] g[22a2] g . . .
so if the second register is initialized to the identity in G, we may classically pre-compute [2i] g
and operate with this element on the second register conditioned on ai for i ∈ [0, 22m) to
perform the exponentiation. A total of 2m group operations are then evaluated quantumly.
When each ai is selected uniformly at random from {0, 1}, as is the case above, the QFT
may be implemented in an interleaved fashion using the semi-classical Fourier transform with
qubit recycling. A single control qubit, and a few standard quantum operations, then suffice to
implement the first control register and the QFT. The quantum cost of the algorithm is then
entirely dominated by the cost of performing the 2m group operations.
If the system in (1) is observed, j and y = [e] g for e ∈ [0, r), are obtained with probability
1
24m
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
t= 0
e2pii (e+tr)j/2
2m
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24m
∣∣∣∣∣
M∑
t= 0
e2pii rj t/2
2m
∣∣∣∣∣
2
·
∣∣∣ e2pii e/22m ∣∣∣2︸ ︷︷ ︸
=1
where M =
⌊
(22m − 1− e)/r⌋. Constructive interference is expected to arise when rj/22m ≈ z,
for z an integer, as all unit vectors in the above sum then point in approximately the direction
1Shor [22] originally described the algorithm specifically for factoring integers N , and then proposed to set
the register length l from N such that N2 ≤ 2l < 2N2. We consider the general order finding problem.
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of the real axis. Shor uses the method of continued fraction expansion to find the unknown
quotient z/r that best approximates the known quotient j/22m. This allows r to be recovered.
If r is not prime, it may be that z and r have a common factor τ , in which case z/τ and r/τ
would be found instead of z and r. To address this problem, Shor proposes to incrementally
compute best approximations to the known quotient of increasing precision, and to search a
small interval in τ to find candidates for the order r ∈ [2m−1, 2m). This significantly increases
the success probability. Shor furthermore proposes to consider not only j, but also j±1, j±2, . . .
up to some bound, to further increase the success probability.
Eker˚a describes in [9] how Shor’s algorithm may be simulated classically for known r. By
post-processing simulated algorithm outputs, it is possible to show that Shor’s algorithm, with
the above post-processing, can be made to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single
run. Eker˚a furthermore explains in [9] how a success probability over 99% may be achieved
using an efficient lattice-based classical post-processing algorithm, that generalizes to higher
dimensions and is applicable to Seifert’s algorithm [21] for computing orders with tradeoffs.
To further increase the success probability of Shor’s order finding algorithm, one approach
is to slightly increase the length of the control register (see e.g. p. 11 and Appendix C in [3],
the paragraph containing eq. (5.44) on p. 227 in [17], or the analysis in [2]). Note however that
this results in a slight increase in the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly,
and hence in an increased quantum cost in each run of the algorithm. Another approach is
to increase the search space in the classical post-processing. For instance, the lattice may be
enumerated when using Eker˚a’s lattice-based post-processing algorithm.
Combinations of and limited tradeoffs between these two approaches are possible, as the
steep reduction in the success probability that arises when the number of operations is reduced
may be compensated for to some extent by searching an increased space, and vice versa.
To summarize, a few group operations may be saved, or have to be additionally evaluated
quantumly, depending on the amount of work that one is willing to perform in the classical
post-processing, and the minimum success probability that one seeks to attain.
1.2.1 Factoring integers
Shor’s original motivation for developing the quantum order finding algorithm was to factor
general composite integers N using the reduction by Miller [14].
To factor N , Shor proposes to first select an integer g on 1 < g < N . In the unlikely event
that g is a non-trivial divisor of N , a factor has been found. Otherwise, g is perceived as a
generator of a subgroup to Z∗N\{1} and its order r computed using the order-finding algorithm.
Given r, Shor then uses that gr − 1 = (gr/2 − 1)(gr/2 + 1) ≡ 0 (mod N) to find non-trivial
factors of N by computing gcd((gr/2 mod N)± 1, N) in a classical post-processing step. This
requires r to be even. If r is odd, or if gr/2 ≡ −1 (mod N) causing trivial factors to be found
in the classical post-processing, the whole algorithm has to be re-run.
The success probability of the classical post-processing step in Shor’s factoring algorithms
can be increased in various ways. Johnston [11] notably points out that any non-trivial divisor
of r may be used to find factors. If r has small to moderate size divisors, this has the potential
to significantly increase the success probability and to allow multiple factors to be found in a
single run of the quantum algorithm. Odd orders are also discussed by Lawson [13].
1.2.2 Breaking RSA
If the integer N is known to be on a special form, this fact may be leveraged. Integers on the
form N = pq, where p and q are distinct prime factors of similar length in bits, are of particular
interest in cryptology, as the problem of factoring such integers, commonly referred to as RSA
integers, underpins the security of the widely deployed RSA cryptosystem [20].
Eker˚a and H˚astad [7, 8] describe how RSA integers may be factored by computing a short
discrete logarithm on the quantum computer, rather than by using order finding, as originally
proposed by Shor. Eker˚a and H˚astad’s quantum algorithm has a lower overall quantum cost
than Shor’s order finding algorithm, in that it requires less than 3m/2 group operations to be
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evaluated in each run when not making tradeoffs (see the Appendix to [8]), compared to 2m
group operations in each run of Shor’s algorithm. Furthermore, the probability of Eker˚a and
H˚astad’s algorithm successfully finding the factors of the RSA integer is over 99% in a single
run of the quantum algorithm when not making tradeoffs (again see the Appendix to [8]).
If tradeoffs are made in Eker˚a and H˚astad’s algorithm, in analogy with Seifert’s [21] idea for
making tradeoffs in Shor’s order finding algorithm, the number of group operations evaluated
in each run can be further reduced to m/2+ for some small . This allows the requirements on
the quantum computer to be further reduced, beyond what is possible with Seifert’s tradeoffs.
However, this reduction comes at the expense of running the algorithm multiple times. Eker˚a
has estimated the number of runs required for a success probability of at least 99% to be
attained when making various tradeoffs (again see the Appendix to [8]).
1.2.3 Computing discrete logarithms
In analogy with the order-finding algorithm, Shor’s algorithm for computing general discrete
logarithms works by inducing a periodicity in d, extracting the period using the quantum
Fourier transform, and classically post-processing the output to extract d.
Specifically, two control registers, each of length m = dlog2 re qubits2, are first initialized
to a uniform superposition of all values a, b ∈ [0, r). Then [a] g [−b]x is computed to a third
register. When two QFTs of size 2m are applied to the two control register, this maps
|Ψ 〉 = 1
r
r−1∑
a= 0
r−1∑
b= 0
| a, b, [a] g  [−b]x 〉
to the quantum system
|Ψ 〉 = 1
2mr
r−1∑
a= 0
r−1∑
b= 0
2m−1∑
j= 0
2m−1∑
k= 0
e2pii (aj+bk)/2
m | j, k, [a− bd] g 〉
that is observed to yield j, k and y = [e] g for e ∈ [0, r). The two frequencies j and k are then
post-processed using a classical algorithm to find d. This algorithm requires r to be known.
As in the order finding algorithm, the quantum cost of this algorithm is dominated by two
sequences of m group operations. However, the implementation is complicated by the fact that
the individual qubits ai and bi in the two control registers are not selected uniformly at random
from {0, 1}, as required by the semi-classical Fourier transform with control qubit recycling. In
this paper, we therefore consider a modified version of Shor’s algorithm for computing discrete
logarithms, in which the superpositions in the control registers are uniform over [0, 2m).
The discrete logarithm problem underpins the security of virtually all widely deployed
asymmetric schemes. Notable examples include RSA3 [20], Diffie-Hellman [4], DSA [5] and
virtually all forms of elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) [12,15]. Despite this, Shor’s algorithm
for computing discrete logarithms has seemingly received less attention in the literature than
Shor’s order finding and factoring algorithms. In particular, we have been unable to find a
tight analysis of the success probability of Shor algorithm for computing discrete logarithms,
when modified as described above to facilitate efficient implementation.
Eker˚a and H˚astad have developed derivatives of Shor’s algorithm for solving cryptologically
relevant instances of the discrete logarithm problem. It is known that a success probability
over 99% may be achieved in a single run of Eker˚a’s algorithm for computing short discrete
logarithms [6, 8], in Eker˚a-H˚astad’s algorithm for computing short discrete logarithms and
factoring RSA integers with tradeoffs [7, 8], and in Eker˚a’s algorithm for computing general
discrete logarithms with tradeoffs [9]. All of these algorithms may be simulated classically for
known d and r, enabling the success probability of the classical post-processing to be verified.
The latter of the three aforementioned algorithms computes general discrete logarithms,
as does Shor’s algorithm for the discrete logarithm problem. Unlike Shor’s algorithm, Eker˚a’s
2Shor [22] originally described the algorithm for the full multiplicative group F∗p and so set r = p− 1.
3e.g. via the reduction to a short discrete logarithm problem
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algorithm does however not require the group order to be known. If the order is unknown,
it may be computed along with the discrete logarithm in the classical post-processing at no
additional quantum cost. When computing discrete logarithms without making tradeoffs,
Eker˚a’s algorithm requires approximately 3m group operations to be evaluated, compared to
2m operations in Shor’s algorithm. This is because Eker˚a’s algorithm computes both d and r,
whereas Shor’s algorithm computes only d given r.
If r is unknown, Eker˚a’s algorithm is more efficient than first running Shor’s order finding
algorithm to find r and then Shor’s discrete logarithm algorithm to find d given r. If r is
known, as is very often the case in practice, and tradeoffs are not made, then Shor’s algorithm
is expected to outperform Eker˚a’s algorithm. However, this is only true assuming that Shor’s
algorithm has a success probability that is on par with that of Eker˚a’s algorithm. Without a
tight analysis of the success probability of Shor’s algorithm, making a proper comparison is
difficult. This fact serves as one of our motivations for writing down this analysis.
It should be noted that Proos and Zalka [19] discuss the success probability (see the short
note in Appendix A.2) of Shor’s algorithm. They state that it should be possible to achieve
a success probability that tends to one, either by performing a limited classical search, or
by evaluating additional group operations quantumly, making reference to the situation being
similar to that in Shor’s order finding algorithm. However, no formal analysis is provided. In
particular, no concrete estimate of the success probability as a function of the size of the search
space, or of the number of additional operations evaluated, is given.
1.3 Our contributions
In this paper, we join an additional piece to the puzzle laid out in the previous sections.
Specifically, we heuristically demonstrate that Shor’s algorithm for computing discrete loga-
rithms, modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform [10] to be used with control qubit
recycling [16], achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single run.
By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and
by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we furthermore show how the
algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run. It is not
sufficient to only perform a limited search to achieve such a high success probability.
We provide concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified algorithm,
as a function of the order r, the size of the search space in the classical post-processing, and the
additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly. This enables fair comparisons to
be made between Shor’s algorithm for computing discrete logarithms and other algorithms.
To develop the aforementioned estimates, we derive a closed-form heuristic approximation
of the probability of the algorithm yielding specific outputs. By integrating this approximation
numerically, we show how to compute a high-resolution histogram that describes the probability
distribution induced by the algorithm. By sampling the histogram, we show how the algorithm
may be simulated classically when the logarithm d and group order r are both known, in the
sense that we may generate outputs that are representative of outputs that would have been
produced by the quantum algorithm, had it been executed on a quantum computer.
1.4 Assumptions and reductions
In this paper, we consider the general discrete logarithm problem in groups of known order r.
Without loss of generality, we may assume r to have no small prime factors. This is because
we may determine all small factors in r classically, and use Pohlig-Hellman decomposition [18]
to reduce the problem to problems in one or more small, and one large, subgroup. We may
then solve the problems in the small order subgroups classically, leaving only the problem in
the subgroup with large order and no small factors to be solved on the quantum computer.
For this very reason r is prime in most cryptologic contexts, and hence void of small factors.
Furthermore, we may without loss of generality assume d to be selected uniformly at random
on [0, r) ⊂ Z. This is because the general discrete logarithm problem can be randomized:
Given g and x′ = [d′] g for any d′ ∈ [0, r) ⊂ Z, we may pick an offset t uniformly at random
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from [0, r) ⊂ Z, compute x = x′ [t] g = [d′+ t] g, compute the randomized discrete logarithm
d = d′+ t = logg x on the quantum computer, and then compute d
′ ≡ d− t (mod r) classically.
1.5 Overview
The rest of this paper is organized as follows:
In Section 2 we describe the quantum algorithm that upon input of a g and x = [d] g
computes an integer pair (j, k). We furthermore analyze the probability distribution it induces,
integrate the distribution to obtain our main results and discuss the soundness of the heuristics
employed. In Section 3 we describe how the pairs (j, k) may be post-processed classically to
recover the logarithm d. We explain how the quantum algorithm may be simulated for known d
and r in Section 4, and summarize and conclude the paper in Section 5.
2 The quantum algorithm
In this section we describe the quantum algorithm, that upon input of a generator g of a group
G of known order r, and an element x = [d] g, outputs a pair (j, k). In the next section, we
show how good pairs (j, k) may be post-processed classically to recover d.
We use m + ` qubits for the two control registers, where 2m−1 ≤ r < 2m, and where the
padding length ` is some small fixed positive integer constant, and proceed as follows:
1. Induce a uniform superposition over the first two control registers
|Ψ 〉 = 1
2m+`
2m+`−1∑
a= 0
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
| a 〉 | b 〉 | 0 〉 .
2. Compute [a] g  [−b]x = [a − bd] g to the third register to obtain
|Ψ 〉 = 1
2m+`
2m+`−1∑
a= 0
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
| a, b, [a − bd] g 〉 .
3. Compute two QFTs of size 2m+` of the first two registers to obtain
|Ψ 〉 = 1
2m+`
2m+`−1∑
a= 0
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
| a, b, [a − bd] g 〉 QFT−−−→
1
22(m+`)
2m+`−1∑
a= 0
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
2m+`−1∑
j= 0
2m+`−1∑
k= 0
e 2pii (aj+bk)/2
m+` | j, k, [a − bd] g 〉 .
4. Observe the system in a measurement to obtain (j, k) and [e] g.
Compared to Shor’s original algorithm that induces a uniform superposition of r values in
the first two registers, this algorithm induces a uniform superposition of 2m+` values, enabling
the semi-classical Fourier transform [10] and qubit recycling [16] to be used.
When using the generalized standard square-and-multiply algorithm to implement the two
generalized exponentiations, the above algorithm requires 2` additional group operations to be
evaluated quantumly, compared to Shor’s original algorithm.
2.1 Analysis of the probability distribution
When the system is observed, the state | j, k, [e] g 〉 is observed with probability
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∑
a
∑
b
exp
[
2pii
2m+`
(aj + bk)
] ∣∣∣∣∣
2
(2)
6
where the sum is over all a, b such that a− bd ≡ e (mod r). This implies that the sum is over
all a on the interval 0 ≤ a = e+ bd+ nrr < 2m+`, so
(2) =
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
∑
nr
exp
[
2pii
2m+`
((e+ bd+ nrr)j + bk)
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
d(2m+`−(e+bd))/re−1∑
nr = d−(e+bd)/re
exp
[
2pii
2m+`
(b(dj + k) + nr(rj))
] ∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eiθdb
d(2m+`−(e+bd))/re−1∑
nr = d−(e+bd)/re
eiθrnr
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eiθdb+iθrd−(e+bd)/re
d(2m+`−(e+bd))/re−d−(e+bd)/re−1∑
nr = 0
eiθrnr
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(3)
where we have introduced arguments αd = {dj+k}2m+` and αr = {rj}2m+` , and corresponding
angles θd = 2piαd/2
m+` and θr = 2piαr/2
m+`.
For δb = (e+ bd)/r + d−(e+ bd)/re = (e+ bd)/r mod 1 ∈ [0, 1) ⊂ R, we have that⌈
(2m+` − (e+ bd))/r⌉− d−(e+ bd)/re =⌈
2m+`/r − (b(e+ bd)/rc+ δb)
⌉− d−(e+ bd)/re =⌈
2m+`/r − δb
⌉
+ d−(e+ bd)/re − d−(e+ bd)/re = ⌈2m+`/r − δb⌉
where we use that d−te = −btc for any t ∈ R. This allows us to simplify (3) to
(3) =
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eiθdb+iθr(δb−(e+bd)/r)
d2m+`/r−δbe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθrnr
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eib(θd−θrd/r)
d2m+`/r−δbe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθr(nr+δb)
∣∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
. (4)
Up until this point, the analysis is exact. We now proceed to estimate (4) heuristically:
For a restricted interval I = [b0, b1) in b of length smaller than 2
m/2, and small φ = θd−θrd/r
of size approximately 2−m, we see that bφ varies very slowly in b. Heuristically, we may therefore
fix any b′ ∈ I and evaluate the sum for this constant. More formally
b1−1∑
b= b0
eibφ
d2m+`/r−δbe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθr(nr+δb) ≈ (b1 − b0) eib′φ
d2m+`/r−δbe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθr(nr+δb). (5)
At the same time, if I is not selected too small, there are still many b ∈ I. Heuristically,
we may then substitute δb with a stochastic variable δ uniformly distributed on [0, 1) ⊂ R, see
the note in Section 2.1.1 for further details. Substituting δb with δ, and taking the expectation
value of the sum in (5), yields
E
d2
m+`/r−δe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθr(nr+δ)
 = ∫ 1
0
d2m+`/r−δe−1∑
nr = 0
eiθr(nr+δ) dδ =
∫ 2m+`/r
0
eiθrt dt. (6)
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Inserting the expectation value in (6) back into (5) yields
(5) ≈ (b1 − b0) eib′φ
∫ 2m+`/r
0
eiθrt dt ≈
b1−1∑
b= b0
eibφ
∫ 2m+`/r
0
eiθrt dt
as we may either sum over b ∈ I, or consider a constant b′ ∈ I, as explained above.
This implies that (4) may be approximated by
(4) ≈ 1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eib(θd−θrd/r)
∫ 2m+`/r
0
eiθrt dt
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
1
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣ eiθr 2
m+`/r − 1
iθr
∣∣∣∣∣
2
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2m+`−1∑
b= 0
eib(θd−θrd/r)
∣∣∣∣∣∣
2
(7)
by combining intervals in b to cover the full range [0, 2m+`).
As we no longer have any dependency on e, we may sum over all r values of e on 0 ≤ e < r
simply by multiplying by r. For φ = θd − θrd/r 6= 0, this yields a closed-form heuristic
expression for the probability P (θd, θr) of observing a pair (j, k) with angle pair (θd, θr):
P (θd, θr) =
r
24(m+`)
∣∣∣∣∣ eiθr 2
m+`/r − 1
iθr
∣∣∣∣∣
2 ∣∣∣∣∣ ei(θd−θrd/r) 2
m+` − 1
ei(θd−θrd/r) − 1
∣∣∣∣∣
2
=
r
24(m+`)
2(1− cos(2m+`/r θr))
θ2r
cos(2m+`(θd − θrd/r))− 1
cos(θd − θrd/r)− 1 . (8)
For φ = θd − θrd/r = 0, we instead obtain
P (θd, θr) =
r
22(m+`)
2(1− cos(2m+`/r θr))
θ2r
. (9)
We expect this heuristic to be good when φ is a small angle of size approximately 2−m.
2.1.1 Notes on the soundness of the heuristic
Recall that δb = (e+ bd)/r mod 1. These numbers are on the form γ + bβ, where γ and β are
two rational numbers. It is a classical result by Weyl (see [26] for Weyl’s original work, see
also Sierpin´ski [24] and Bohl [1] for independent original works, or [25] for a modern textbook
reference) that if β is an irrational number then, in the limit, the numbers bβ mod 1 are equally
distributed on [0, 1) (the additive offset γ clearly does not matter) when b runs over all integers.
We are interested in the distribution of δb when b is contained in an interval significantly
shorter than r, but still of large size. In this situation it does not matter that d/r is a rational
number, and we can obtain a finite version of Weyl’s theorem when d is random. We plan to
make this precise in the final version of the paper. For further details, see Section 5.1.
2.2 Distribution of pairs
In this section we analyze the distribution of argument pairs (αd, αr) in the argument plane.
Definition 2.1. Let 2κr be the greatest power of two that divides r.
Definition 2.2. An argument αr is said to be admissible if αr is a multiple of 2
κr .
Recall that the order r may be assumed to have no small factors, see Section 1.4. It follows
that we may assume κr = 0, which in turn implies that all arguments αr are admissible.
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Claim 2.1. The number of integers j ∈ [0, 2m+`) that yield a given argument αr = {rj}2m+`
is 2κr if αr is an admissible argument, and zero otherwise.
Proof. The modulus is a power of two and 2κr is the greatest power of two to divide r. 
Claim 2.2. The number of integer pairs (j, k), where j, k ∈ [0, 2m+`), that yield a given
argument αd = {dj + k}2m+` is 2m+`.
Proof. For any given j ∈ [0, 2m+`) there is exactly one k that yields a given argument αd. 
2.3 Constructive interference
Constructive interference is expected to arise in (8) when the absolute value of the angle
φ = θd − θr d
r
=
2pi
2m+`
(
αd − αr d
r
)
(10)
is small, that is when αd =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆ for some small integer ∆. This is why we developed a
heuristic that is good for small φ ∼ 2−m. As we are interested in pairs (j, k) with arguments
(αd, αr) on this form, it is useful to formally introduce the notion of B-good pairs:
Definition 2.3. A pair (j, k) is said to be B-good if αd =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆ for |∆ | ≤ B.
Note that αd on the above form always exists for a given admissible αr and a given ∆, as j
determines αr by Claim 2.1, and as αd may be selected via k for any fixed j by Claim 2.2.
For αd =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆, we have that (10) simplifies to
(10) = φ =
2pi
2m+`
(⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆− αr d
r
)
=
2pi
2m+`
(∆ + δ∆) (11)
where δ∆ =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋− αr dr ∈ [− 12 , 12).
Substituting (11) into (8), heuristically replacing δ∆ with a stochastic variable δ uniformly
distributed on
[− 12 , 12), and computing the expectation value, yields
r
24(m+`)
2(1− cos(2m+`/r θr))
θ2r
∫ 1/2
δ=−1/2
cos(2piδ)− 1
cos(2pi(∆ + δ)/2m+`)− 1 dδ. (12)
Integrating (12) over all θr = 2piαr/2
m+`, summed over all |∆| ≤ B, yields
2κrr
22(m+`)
∫ 2m+`−κr−1
−2m+`−κr−1
1− cos(2piαr/r)
2pi2α2r
dαr
∑
|∆|≤B
∫ 1/2
δ=−1/2
cos(2piδ)− 1
cos(2pi(∆ + δ)/2m+`)− 1 dδ (13)
where we account for the fact that only arguments αr that are divisible by 2
κr are admissible,
and that the admissible αr occur with multiplicity 2
κr , by Claim 2.1. As we may assume r not
to have small factors, see Section 1.4, this is not strictly necessary.
Equation (13) may be evaluated numerically to heuristically estimate how the probability
mass is distributed as a function of ∆ and the padding length `. As may be see in Table 1, it
is necessary to select both ` and B greater than zero to obtain a B-good pair with probability
over 99% in a single run. If we have no additional padding bits and do not perform a search,
as in Shor’s original algorithm, a B-good pair is obtained with probability approximately 60%
in a single run when r = 2m − 1. If r is instead close to the lower end of the interval, say
r = 2m−1 + 1, then this probability increases to approximately 70%. Essentially, all rows in
Table 1 are shifted upwards one step (as halving r is equivalent to adding a padding bit).
In practice, the order r is often randomly selected, as a prime on [2m−1, 2m), in cryptologic
applications. A notable exception are the NIST P-192, P-224, P-256, P-384 and P-521 elliptic
curve groups that have orders close to powers of two [5] to enable efficient classical arithmetic.
The logarithm d may be deterministically recovered classically from a B-good pair (j, k),
assuming r to be known and a small search to be performed over ∆, see the next section.
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|∆| ≤ B where B is
` 0 1 2 · · · 10 20 50 100 200 500
0 0.5986 0.7204 0.7421 · · · 0.7662 0.7699 0.7721 0.7729 0.7733 0.7735
1 0.6985 0.8406 0.8659 · · · 0.8941 0.8984 0.9010 0.9019 0.9024 0.9026
2 0.7350 0.8845 0.9111 · · · 0.9408 0.9452 0.9480 0.9490 0.9495 0.9497
3 0.7542 0.9076 0.9349 · · · 0.9653 0.9699 0.9728 0.9738 0.9743 0.9746
4 0.7639 0.9193 0.9470 · · · 0.9778 0.9825 0.9854 0.9863 0.9868 0.9871
5 0.7688 0.9252 0.9531 · · · 0.9841 0.9888 0.9917 0.9927 0.9932 0.9935
6 0.7712 0.9281 0.9561 · · · 0.9872 0.9919 0.9948 0.9958 0.9963 0.9966
7 0.7725 0.9296 0.9576 · · · 0.9888 0.9935 0.9964 0.9974 0.9979 0.9982
8 0.7731 0.9304 0.9584 · · · 0.9896 0.9943 0.9972 0.9982 0.9987 0.9990
Table 1: Probability mass captured by (13) for m = 128 and r = 2m − 1. The same
table is obtained for greater m. Selecting smaller r ∈ [2m−1, 2m) yields slightly larger
probabilities. This table was created by evaluating (13) numerically using Mathematica.
3 Classical post-processing
Assume that the quantum algorithm yields a B-good pair (j, k) with associated argument pair
(αd, αr). Then αd =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆ for some integer ∆ such that |∆ | ≤ B. This implies
αd − αr d
r
= ∆ + δ∆
⇒ {dj + k}2m+` − {rj}2m+`
d
r
= ∆ + δ∆
⇒ dj + k − {rj}2m+`
d
r
+ nd2
m+` = ∆ + δ∆
⇒ rdj + rk − {rj}2m+`d+ ndr2m+` = r(∆ + δ∆)
⇒ d(rj − {rj}2m+`) + rk + ndr2m+` = r(∆ + δ∆)
⇒ d (rj − {rj}2m+`)
2m+`︸ ︷︷ ︸
known z ∈Z
+
rk
2m+`
+ ndr =
r(∆ + δ∆)
2m+`
⇒ dz +
⌈
rk
2m+`
⌋
+ ndr =
⌈
r(∆ + δ∆)
2m+`
⌋
︸ ︷︷ ︸
unknown small t
⇒ dz +
⌈
rk
2m+`
⌋
≡ t (mod r)
which we may solve for d by using modular arithmetic. This yields
d ≡
(
t−
⌈
rk
2m+`
⌋)
z−1 (mod r) (14)
where we need to search at most 2 · | t |+ 1 < 2 ⌈(B + 1/2)/2`⌋+ 1 values to recover d.
If r is prime and z 6= 0, the modular inverse of z exists. In the unlikely event that z = 0,
the quantum algorithm has to be re-run. If r is composite, it may be that gcd(z, r) 6= 1, in
which case the inverse of z modulo r does not exist. Let τ be the smallest positive integer such
that gcd(z, r/τ) = 1. Then (14) still holds modulo r/τ , and for this modulus the inverse of
z does exist. This implies that we may recover d mod (r/τ) , and add multiples of r/τ , until
d is recovered. For small τ this search for d is efficient.
Note that r may be assumed to have no small divisors without loss of generality, see
Section 1.4. When r has large factors only, it is improbable that gcd(z, r) 6= 1 for random z.
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The above post-processing algorithm is identical to that originally proposed by Shor [22]
except for the searches over t and multiples of r/τ . Note that this post-processing algorithm
requires r to be known. If r is unknown, the quantum algorithm in [9] is more efficient than
first running Shor’s order finding algorithm [22] and then running the algorithm in this paper.
4 Simulating the quantum algorithm
By piecewise numerical integration of (13) over small intervals in αr for different fixed ∆,
a high-resolution histogram may be constructed that captures the probability distribution
induced by the quantum algorithm. By sampling (αr,∆) from this histogram, computing
αd =
⌈
αr
d
r
⌋
+ ∆, first solving αr = {rj}2m+` for j and then solving αd = {dj + k}2m+` for k
given j, we may simulate the quantum algorithm for known d and r, in the sense that we may
generate outputs (j, k) that are representative of outputs that would have been produced by
the quantum algorithm, had it been run on an actual quantum computer.
We have implemented the simulator in C using MPFR, with Simpson’s method followed
by Richardson extrapolation to cancel linear error terms. Unsurprisingly, running the classical
post-processing algorithm on simulated quantum algorithm outputs recovers d, provided that
the sample does not fall outside the range captured by the histogram. As ` and ∆ increase,
the probability mass captured by the histogram tends to one, again see Table 1.
The above is in analogy with the simulators previously developed for Shor’s and Seifert’s
order-finding algorithms [9, 21, 22], and for Eker˚a and H˚astad’s algorithms for computing dis-
crete logarithms [8, 9], see these references for further details. Note that the fact that we may
simulate these quantum algorithm does not imply that we may solve for example the discrete
logarithm problem classically, as d must be known for it to be possible to run the simulator.
5 Summary and conclusion
We have heuristically shown that Shor’s algorithm for computing general discrete logarithms,
modified to allow the semi-classical Fourier transform to be used with control qubit recycling,
achieves a success probability of approximately 60% to 70% in a single run.
By slightly increasing the number of group operations that are evaluated quantumly, and
by performing a limited search in the classical post-processing, we have furthermore shown
how the algorithm can be modified to achieve a success probability over 99% in a single run.
It is not sufficient to only perform a limited search to achieve such a high success probability.
We have provided concrete heuristic estimates of the success probability of the modified
algorithm, as a function of the group order, the size of the search space in the classical post-
processing, and the additional number of group operations evaluated quantumly. This enables
fair comparisons to be made between Shor’s algorithm and other algorithms.
To develop the aforementioned estimates, we derived a closed-form heuristic approximation
of the probability of the algorithm yielding specific outputs. By numerically integrating this
approximation, we showed how to compute a high-resolution histogram that describes the
probability distribution induced by the algorithm. By sampling the histogram, we showed how
the algorithm may be simulated classically when the logarithm d and group order r are both
known, in the sense that we may generate outputs that are representative of outputs that would
have been produced by the quantum algorithm, had it been run on a quantum computer.
5.1 Future work
Unlike our earlier works [6–9], in which we provided exact analyses, or approximations with
associated error bounds, the analysis presented in this paper is heuristical. We are however
quite confident that a bound on the error in the heuristic approximation may be derived. We
are currently in the process of exploring this line of research.
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